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Recent evidence on the large variance in teacher effectiveness has spurred renewed interest in teacher
labor market policies.  A substantial body of prior research documents that more highly qualified teachers
tend to work in more advantaged schools, although this literature cannot determine the relative importance
of supply versus demand factors in generating this equilibrium outcome.  To isolate the importance
of teacher labor supply, we attended three large teacher job fairs in Chicago during the summer of
2006 and collected detailed information on the specific schools at which teachers interviewed.  We
document a substantial variation in the number of applicants per school, with some schools having
fewer than five applicants and others schools having over 300 applicants, even after controlling for
the number and type of positions advertised at the school.  We show that the demographic characteristics
of schools strongly predict the number of applicants to the school in the expected direction.  Interestingly,
the geographic location of the school is an extremely strong predictor of applications, even after controlling
for a host of observable school and neighborhood characteristics.
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  Interest in the distribution of teachers across schools has grown in recent years.  Race to 
the Top, President Obama’s $4 billion dollar state-level grant competition aimed at school 
improvement, focuses on recruiting and retaining effective teachers, particularly in 
disadvantaged schools and districts.  This renewed focus on teachers as a key element of 
education reform stems, at least in part, from a substantial body of research indicating that 
teachers make an important contribution to student achievement and that teacher quality varies 
substantially (Aaronson, Barrow, & Sander, 2007; Hanushek, Kain, O’Brian, & Rivkin, 2005; 
Nye, Konstantopoulos, & Hedges, 2004; Rockoff, 2004).   
The knowledge that teachers matter has been accompanied by an increased interest in 
understanding teacher labor markets.  Research on teacher sorting finds that low income and 
minority students are more likely to have teachers who are both inexperienced and less qualified 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2005, 2006; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002).  A substantial 
body of research also examines teacher mobility, finding that teachers who switch schools 
generally move to schools with lower concentrations of minority and disadvantaged students and 
higher levels of achievement (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2005a; Hanushek, Kain & 
Rivkin, 2004; Scafidi, Stinebrickner, & Sjoquist, 2007), and that teachers who choose to transfer 
schools or exit the teaching profession generally have better qualifications (e.g. higher 
certification exam scores) than those who remain (Boyd, et al., 2005a; Goldhaber, Gross, & 
Player, 2007).  
  While we know that disadvantaged students are more likely to be taught by less qualified 
(and perhaps) less effective teachers, we know less about whether this disparity is caused by 
decisions on the part of teachers or school administrators.  The distribution of teachers across 2 
 
schools is a product of both supply and demand.  Thus, it is difficult to parse out the extent to 
which this distribution results from supply (e.g. teachers’ decisions to teach in particular districts 
or schools) versus demand-related factors (e.g. principals’ hiring preferences or district rules and 
regulations).  For example, studies of teacher mobility generally cannot tell us whether a 
teacher’s exit from a particular school resulted from a decision made by the teacher himself or by 
administrators.   
One important exception is a recent analysis that isolates teacher preferences by using 
data on teacher applications to transfer across schools (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Ronfeldt, 
Wyckoff, 2010).  The authors find that teachers with better pre-service qualifications are more 
likely to apply to transfer, while teachers with higher value-added are less likely to do so.  The 
authors also find that schools are more likely to select teachers who are better qualified across all 
measures.  While this study makes an important contribution, it is limited by its focus on 
experienced teachers seeking to transfer schools.   
  In this paper, we use a unique data set composed of teacher applications to individual 
Chicago Public Schools (CPS) to explore the distribution of the teacher applicant pool within a 
large urban district.  Many school districts maintain teacher applicant files centrally.  However, 
in most cases, like CPS, the schools to which individual teachers apply remains unknown, 
making it very difficult to examine variation in the characteristics and qualifications of teachers 
applying to different types of schools within a district.  In the summer of 2006, we attended three 
large job fairs hosted by CPS.  At the job fairs, we compiled extensive data on the schools to 
which job fair attendees applied.  We link this application data to administrative files containing 
candidates’ demographic information, allowing us to describe the applicant pool and examine 
differences in applicant qualifications across schools.  These data allow us to describe the 3 
 
preferences of an entire district’s applicant pool, expanding on recent contributions to 
understanding teacher labor supply made by Boyd and colleagues (2010). 
  We find that schools serving fewer disadvantaged students (as measured by percentage of 
students eligible for free lunch) have larger numbers of applicants, and that this measure of 
disadvantage is more consistently predictive of number of applicants than are other school 
demographic characteristics such as student racial/ethnic composition, academic achievement, 
and percent of students with limited English proficiency (LEP).  Interestingly, the geographic 
location of the school is also an important predictor of applications, with more candidates 
applying to schools on the north and northwest sides of Chicago, which are generally more 
affluent with a smaller fraction of African-American and Latino households.  However, the 
geographic region in which the school is located remains a significant and important predictor of 
applications even after controlling for a host of student, school and neighborhood characteristics 
(including distance from school to the downtown area, census measures of tract-level poverty 
and tract-level crime rates provided by the Chicago Police Department).  This suggests that some 
harder-to-observe factors such as commute time or school/neighborhood reputation are important 
determinants of teacher supply.   
We also find that preferences for school characteristics vary by applicant characteristics, 
with African American candidates more likely to apply to schools on the city’s south side (a 
predominately African American area of Chicago), and Hispanic candidates more likely to apply 
to schools serving larger proportions of LEP students.  Finally, we find that the small number of 
applicants with undergraduate degrees in mathematics or science (only 5% of the applicant 
sample) are more likely to apply to schools serving more academically proficient students. 
  4 
 
It is interesting to consider these findings in light of recent efforts by CPS officials to 
recruit teacher candidates.  While the 2006 applicant pool contained over 11 potential candidates 
for each eventual hire, our analyses indicate that the vast majority of those applicants – including 
many of the most highly qualified applicants – will not apply to the schools serving the most 
disadvantaged students.  This suggests that targeted efforts to direct a larger number of qualified 
applicants to hard-to-staff schools could have important benefits. 
Our paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 of this paper provides a review of the extant 
literature.  In section 3, we describe teacher hiring and recruitment policies and procedures for 
the CPS.  Section 4 describes the data used in this paper.  In section 5 we present our findings, 
and in section 6 we share our conclusions.   
 
2. Prior Literature on Teacher Labor Markets 
Studies examining the distribution of teachers across both districts and schools find that 
teachers in urban schools serving large concentrations of low income and minority children are 
less experienced (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2005; Lankford, et. al., 2002; Rockoff, 2004), 
more likely to be teaching out-of-field (Ingersoll, 2003), more likely to be uncertified, score 
lower on standardized tests, and tend to have graduated from less competitive colleges and 
universities (Lankford, et. al., 2002) than their suburban counterparts.  Using data from New 
York State, Lankford, et. al. (2002) find that teachers in urban schools are substantially less 
qualified on pre-service measures, and that low income, low achieving and non-white students 
tend to be taught by the least qualified teachers within urban districts.  Studies also find that 
variation in wages does not seem to substantially increase the likelihood that qualified teachers 
will teach in these school settings (Lankford, et. al. 2002; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004).  5 
 
Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2006) find that even within schools, more advantaged students are 
taught by more qualified teachers.   
In addition to describing the distribution of teachers across schools and districts, research 
also examines entry into teaching as well as teacher mobility and attrition.  Teacher attrition rates 
are higher in urban schools and districts with larger concentrations of low income and minority 
students (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Ingersoll, 2001).  Using Texas data to examine teacher 
mobility, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) find that teachers who transfer schools tend to 
move to schools serving more advantaged and higher achieving student populations, and that 
student demographic characteristics including race/ethnicity and academic achievement appear 
to exert a larger influence on teacher mobility than salary.   
College graduates with high test scores are less likely to enter and more likely to exit 
teaching (Podgursky, Monroe, & Watson, 2004; Stinebrickner, 2002).  Studies of teacher 
mobility also find that teachers who choose to transfer schools or exit the teaching profession 
generally have better qualifications (e.g. higher test scores, degrees from more selective colleges) 
than those who remain (Goldhaber, Gross, & Player, 2007; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002; 
Podgursky, Monroe, & Watson, 2004).  Further, teachers who leave urban schools and, more 
generally, schools serving disadvantaged student populations tend to be more highly qualified 
than teachers who remain in those schools (Boyd, et. al. 2005a; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 
2004).   
Interestingly, however, studies that examine teacher mobility using estimates of teacher 
effectiveness along with or instead of pre-service qualifications tend to find that teacher quality 
varies more within than between schools (Hanushek, et. al., 2005), and that more effective 
teachers are actually more likely to remain in their schools than their less effective colleagues 6 
 
(Boyd, et. al. 2008; Goldhaber, et. al., 2007; Hanushek, et. al., 2005).  More experienced teachers 
are also more likely to remain in their schools (Ingersoll & Smith, 2003).  Boyd, et. al. (2010) 
note that this evidence suggests that while teachers with stronger pre-service qualifications are 
more likely to both transfer schools and leave teaching, those with more experience and those 
with larger value-added estimates tend to remain in their schools, even if they teach in more 
challenging environments (e.g. Goldhaber, et. al., 2007).    
Another factor that appears to strongly influence where teachers choose to teach is 
geography (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2005a, 2005b).  Specifically, the authors find 
that teachers prefer to teach close to where they live and close to where they are from.  Boyd, 
Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2005b) find teacher labor markets to be very small in terms of 
geography, and that teachers tend to teach close to where they grew up, or in areas similar to 
where they are from.  Reininger (2006) replicates these findings using nationally representative 
data.  She also finds that teachers are more likely to remain close to their place of origin than the 
vast majority of other professionals.   
 
3. Background on CPS Teacher Recruitment and Hiring 
  Principals of CPS schools interview and select the teachers for their schools 
autonomously.  The CPS Department of Human Resources provides extensive support and 
resources to principals for the hiring process.  The district maintains a large data base of job 
applicants for principals who are hiring, as well as a database of open positions for applicants.  
Human Resources is also charged with processing new teachers into the system and completing 
the hiring process once they have accepted an offer from a school principal.   7 
 
  Over the past decade, the CPS Department of Human Resources (HR) has implemented a 
comprehensive array of events and services aimed at recruiting teachers into the district.  Efforts 
have been made to go beyond what has traditionally been a highly localized recruitment and 
hiring process to search regionally and even nationally for qualified teachers.  CPS provides 
information sessions, both virtual and in person, to answer potential teaching candidates’ 
questions about CPS, Chicago, and the hiring process. HR also participates in numerous college 
and university job fairs throughout the Midwest and invites qualified candidates to participate in 
“bus tours” that provide direct contact with school personnel and the opportunity to see Chicago 
neighborhoods first-hand.  Job candidates and school principals also have access to an extensive 
online database which holds information about current and future teacher vacancies and provides 
principals with the opportunity to search for applicants and view their information and resumes.   
The most intensive recruitment effort on the part of CPS has been the development of 
large-scale job fairs, exclusively for qualified teachers, hosted by the district.  The district 
typically holds two smaller fairs during late winter/early spring and then hosts approximately 
three large-scale job fairs during late spring and summer.  The larger job fairs are held at the 
largest venues in Chicago (e.g. Navy Pier, Soldier Field) and typically host over 200 schools and 
2000 to 3000 teacher candidates per event.  Candidates have the opportunity to drop off resumes 
and participate in preliminary interviews with school principals and administrators during the 
hiring cycle for a single school year.   
To provide a broad sense of the number and type of individuals applying to the CPS, 
Table 1 shows some basic information on teachers who applied to the district during 2006 (i.e., 
for the 2006-2007 school year).  In some cases, individuals applied electronically on-line.  In 
other cases, they submitted an application through the mail and HR personnel entered this 8 
 
information into the electronic teacher application database.  Nearly 20,000 individuals applied 
to the district in 2006.  Almost three-quarters of applicants were women and the majority was 
white (roughly 20 percent of the applicant pool reported to be African American).  Of applicants 
for whom we were able to obtain degree information (two-thirds of the total sample), over 60 
percent majored in education in college.  Approximately 40 percent attended undergraduate 
institutions that are ranked as very competitive or higher by Barron’s.  Approximately 60 percent 
of applicants report prior teaching experience.   
Column 2 provides comparable information on teachers who were newly hired by CPS 
for the 2006-07 school year.  The 1,679 teachers who were hired by CPS are similar to the 
applicant pool in terms of gender and race, although they are somewhat more likely to be 
Hispanic and less likely to be white.  Interestingly, the 2006-07 new hires attended schools with 
substantially lower Barron’s ratings, on average, than the applicant pool as a whole.  Over half 
(57%) of new hires attended schools in the bottom two Barron’s categories, compared with only 
about 21 percent of CPS applicants.  Similarly, while 40 percent of applicants attended colleges 
ranked in the top 3 Barron’s categories, only 15 percent of new hires’ had degrees from schools 
ranked ‘very competitive’ or higher.   
CPS new hires were also less experienced, on average, than the applicant pool as a whole.  
Fully 70 percent of new hires had no prior teaching experience, compared with 39 percent of 
applicants.  It is important to recognize that new hires reflect both demand factors (which 
applicants were offered positions) and supply factors (which candidates accepted the offers).  
The numbers in Table 1 do not help us understand the extent to which differences between CPS 
applicants and eventual hires result from decisions on the part of principals or on the part of 




  The data for the analyses presented here are drawn from a number of sources including 
electronic teacher applications to the district, school-level information about the number of 
vacancies in a particular school and the needs of the school in various subject areas, and 
information about the schools to which each candidate applied.     
  During the summer of 2006, we collected data at the three large CPS job fairs.  The goal 
of this data collection effort was to gather information detailing each of the individual schools 
that job candidates applied to at the fairs.  To obtain this information, prior to each job fair we 
acquired the list of schools registered to attend the fair from staff in CPS HR.  Each school that 
attends a CPS job fair has an individual table at the fair where the school principal and/or 
administrators sit, place relevant literature and information, accept resumes and interview 
candidates.  We used the list provided by CPS HR to generate school-level sign in sheets for 
every school that attended each of the three job fairs.  With the support of HR staff, we informed 
all principals who were attending the fairs about the process, explaining that the sign-in sheets 
were being provided so that every job candidate who visited the schools’ table would sign the 
sheet and provide the last four digits of her social security number.  Sign-in sheets were placed 
on each school’s table directly in front of the principal and other administrators who were 
available to talk with and interview applicants as they circulated through the fair and approached 
individual schools.   
The CPS job fairs are large, chaotic and crowded.  To improve our chances of collecting 
complete and accurate data, the authors and several research assistants attended each fair and 
circulated throughout the room during the event.  We reminded principals and school personnel 10 
 
to ask all applicants to sign the sign-in sheets when they approached the schools’ tables.  To 
encourage principals to use the sign-in sheets, we provided them with copies and explained that 
they could use them to keep track of candidates who had applied for vacancies at their schools.  
Throughout each fair, we circulated and answered principals’ questions, provided additional 
sign-in sheets, and worked to ensure that sign-in sheets were being used by all schools and 
signed by all applicants.  As schools finished up and closed down their tables, we collected their 
sign-in sheets.   
  In this manner, we obtained sign-in data for approximately 87 percent of the 371 schools 
that attended job fairs that summer.  The sign-in data for the remaining schools was incomplete 
or problematic, most often because these schools arrived at the fair very late or left very early. 
Many of these schools left their sign-in sheets at the fair even after they left, and teacher 
candidates frequently listed their names on these sheets to receive additional information about 
the school.  While this does indicate some interest on the part of the candidate, we felt it was 
different from waiting in line and interviewing with a school’s principal.  Thus, we decided to 
exclude this information from our analysis. In other cases, we observed some schools that did not 
utilize the sign-in sheets and a small number of schools refused to participate in the study.  Other 
schools with problematic data were repeatedly observed not using the sign-in sheets or, at times, 
had so many applicants lined up at their tables or had such a loosely organized means for 
interviewing and screening candidates that they failed to use the sign-in sheets consistently.   
  Table 2 provides summary statistics on all schools in CPS, separated to allow one to 
compare the characteristics of schools that participated in the job fairs with those that did not.  
Schools that participated in CPS job fairs were more likely to serve a predominately African 
American student population and less likely to be predominately Hispanic.  Job fair schools were 11 
 
larger and lower achieving, on average, than schools that did not participate.  Not surprisingly, 
schools that participated in job fairs reported more job openings in May of 2006 than those that 
did not;  nearly six openings on average versus four, respectively.  Although charter schools are 
allowed to participate in CPS job fairs, they are excluded from descriptive tables and from the 
analysis sample because the majority of charter schools attending the job fairs were part of 
charter organizations that interviewed candidates centrally for position openings in multiple 
schools.  Thus, we are unable to disaggregate applications for individual charter schools.   
  Columns 5-8 compare the schools attending job fairs that had usable sign-in data (i.e., our 
analysis sample, n=321) to schools attending the job fairs with incomplete or problematic data.  
Schools with problematic sign in data were more likely to be predominately African American, 
and were lower achieving than schools with usable sign in data.  Schools that are excluded from 
our analyses because of poor sign in data also had an average of two more positions open in May 
2006.    
  The number of candidates that interviewed at each school (i.e., the count of the sign-ins) 
serves as the outcome measure in our analysis.  We view this measure of the “number of 
applications” to the school as a reasonable proxy for teacher supply, although it has several 
important limitations.  First, it contains some measurement error, as not every teacher who 
interviewed at the school signed the sheet.  To the extent that this is classical measurement error 
in a dependent variable, however, it will merely make our regression estimates less precise 
without introducing any bias.  Second, we observed that in some cases candidates were not 
willing to wait in very long lines to interview with particular schools.  For this reason, our 
measure may actually understate teacher interest in the most popular schools.  This will tend to 12 
 
bias our regression estimates toward zero, suggesting that our results may underestimate the 
relationship between school characteristics and teacher labor supply.    
While this is a limitation of our data, it is important to note that there is substantial 
variation in the number of applications across schools.  Figure 1 shows a histogram of the 
number of applications per school using the total number of applications to the school across all 
three fairs.  Table 3 provides participation and vacancy information reported by schools.  The 
number of applicants per school varies substantially, with an average of 55 applicants per school 
per fair, and a standard deviation of 37.  Schools at the 10
th percentile had 18 applicants per fair, 
compared with 102 applicants for schools at the 90
th percentile.       
  We match the application data to school-level data we obtained from the CPS.  This data 
includes not only school demographics that might be relevant to job applicants (e.g., racial 
composition, poverty and achievement levels in the school), but also information on the number 
of open positions in the school as of May 2006 (prior to the first large job fair).  
  Finally, we have information about the specific needs of each school taken from online 
registration forms that schools completed prior to each job fair.  This information includes the 
number of current vacancies, the number of anticipated vacancies and the number of new hires 
the school was looking to make at the fair.  In addition, the school indicated whether it was 
looking to make one or more hires in a number of different fields (e.g., pre-kindergarten, 
elementary education, special education, bilingual education, math and science).   
  Table 3 shows summary statistics for our sample overall and separately for elementary 
and secondary schools.  High schools were more likely to participate in job fairs than elementary 
schools, likely reflecting the fact that they were typically looking to hire more than seven people 
(7.3) compared with an average of less than four (3.7) for elementary schools.  Despite the fact 13 
 
that they had more vacancies, high schools typically had fewer applicants than elementary 
schools, with an average of 51 applicants per school compared with 56 for elementary schools.  
Schools attending job fairs were frequently looking to fill positions in areas that are often 
considered harder to staff such as special education and mathematics or science.  Over half of 
schools reported needing to find candidates to teach special education classes.  Fully 70 percent 
of schools reported vacancies in math or science compared with 65 percent of schools looking to 
hire in English or social studies.   
5.  Results 
Our primary objective is to examine whether teacher labor supply is correlated with 
observable school characteristics.  In particular, prior literature suggests that teachers are less 
likely to apply to disadvantaged schools as measured by student demographic composition 
including race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and academic achievement.  To explore this 
issue, we regress the number of applications in school s at fair f on a variety of school 
demographic characteristics controlling for indicators for the number and type of vacancies in 
the school.  In all cases, we present robust standard errors clustered at the school level.  Missing 
data dummies are included for independent variables and controls.   
Table 4 provides our main results.  In all columns, we show results from OLS regressions 
where the dependent variable is number of job fair applicants per school.  The various 
specifications show changes in the dependent variable as different school characteristics are 
added to the model.  Column 1 shows coefficients from different regressions that estimate 
number of job fair applicants using either single variables or clusters of similar variables.  In 
other words, the results shown in column 1 reflect many different regression specifications.  The 
faint dotted lines indicate the different specifications.  In terms of school racial/ethnic 14 
 
composition, we see that schools with a larger proportion of White or Asian students had more 
applicants.  A ten percentage point increase in White or Asian students is associated, on average, 
with nearly four more applicants per school.  Free lunch eligibility is correlated with number of 
job applicants per fair in the expected direction, with a ten percentage point increase in free 
lunch eligible students associated with four fewer applicants per school for each job fair in which 
they participated.  Academic achievement is positively associated with number of applicants, as 
is percent limited English proficient.   
Interestingly, indicators for region suggest that geography may play an important part in 
candidates’ school preferences.  The omitted region, Region 1, is the region that encompasses 
Chicago’s northernmost and northwest neighborhoods.  Regions 2 and 3 encompass the areas 
closest to and west of the city center.  Regions 4 through 6 move progressively southward, with 
Region 6 including Chicago’s southernmost neighborhoods.  The regressions including only CPS 
region show a preference for schools in neighborhoods on Chicago’s north side, with far south 
side schools in Region 6 having an average of 29 fewer applicants per fair than schools on the far 
north side.  The schools in Region 6 have a much higher fraction of African-American students 
than the schools in Region 1, suggesting a teacher desire to avoid high minority schools.  It is 
also possible that these strong regional/geographic preferences reflect teacher preferences in 
terms of neighborhood desirability or proximity to the teacher’s own neighborhood, which we 
discuss in more detail below.    
As would be expected, schools reporting a larger number of anticipated vacancies and 
those looking to fill more positions typically had more applicants.  Column 2 shows the 
coefficients on school-level racial/ethnic composition controlling for number and type of 15 
 
vacancies, school enrollment, and grade level.  Including controls does not alter the relationship 
substantially, with more teachers still applying to schools that serve fewer minority students.   
Columns 3 through 5 show the relationship between school racial/ethnic composition and 
number of applicants adding percent eligible for free lunch, school-level academic achievement, 
and percent LEP, respectively.  When the percentage of free lunch-eligible students is included 
with racial composition, both free-lunch eligibility and percentage of White and Asian students 
remain statistically significant, although the magnitude of each coefficient is reduced.  The 
pattern is similar when percent proficient is included in the model, although percent proficient is 
no longer statistically significant.  When percent LEP is added to the model including indicators 
for race/ethnicity, its magnitude drops  to near zero, and it becomes statistically insignificant.  
Column 6 provides coefficients from a model that includes racial/ethnic composition indicators 
as well as percent proficient, percent free lunch-eligible, and percent LEP.  Interestingly, when 
all of these variables are included, only free lunch eligibility remains statistically significant.   
Column 7 adds the region indicators to the model.  Free lunch eligibility, again, remains 
statistically significant.  Although not all region indicators are statically significant, the pattern of 
results indicates that teachers’ preferences for geography remain remarkably unchanged when 
included in the same model as school-level student demographic characteristics.  Column 8 adds 
school neighborhood information by zip code including percent poverty, percent African 
American, percent Hispanic, miles to central business district, and prevalence of both property 
and violent crimes.  While the magnitude of the region indicators drops, these variable remain 
statistically significant and substantively large. This suggests that there may be some 
unobservable (to the researcher) characteristics associated with certain regions within CPS that 16 
 
are correlated with desirability on the part of teachers.  Such factors could include reputation or 
perceived safety of the school or surrounding area.   
Table 5 shows additional specifications of the baseline model (column 8 of Table 4) in 
order to assess the robustness of the results discussed above. Interestingly, we see that percent of 
students who are free lunch eligible remains a statistically significant predictor of the number of 
applicants to a school across a number of different specifications.  The region indicators remain 
important determinants of teacher applications, although in models with only one observation per 
school (as opposed to observations for each school x job fair) the precision of these variables 
declines substantially.  
Columns 5-8 in Table 5 show results separately for elementary and high schools.  The 
first column for each level shows bivariate results or results for groups of similar variables, and 
columns 6 and 8 show the results for the preferred model for elementary and high schools 
respectively.  While we lose considerable precision when we split the sample, several important 
findings stand out.  First, the region indicators are important determinants of applications for 
both elementary and high schools.  The fully specified models (columns 6 and 8) indicate that 
region appears to play an important role for applicants to elementary schools.  The number of 
applicants per school varies substantially by region, with far south side schools having an 
average of 16 fewer applicants per school than far north side schools.  While the region 
indicators are statistically insignificant in the fully specified high school models for all regions 
except Region 3, coefficients and standard errors suggest that this may be due to reduced 
precision and power rather than to a lack of association.  Coefficients range from 20 to 33 fewer 
applicants per school in high schools not located on the city’s far north side, substantially larger 
in magnitude than coefficients in the elementary school model. 17 
 
Second, student poverty (conditional on the other variables, including student race and 
academic proficiency) appears to be a more important determinant of applications to elementary 
schools than high schools.  Conversely, student academic proficiency (conditional on other 
variables) appears to be a more important determinant of high school applications.  
Unfortunately, the very low precision of our estimates precludes us from drawing strong 
conclusions from these results.   
In addition to examining the application behavior of candidates in aggregate, we are 
interested in exploring whether the preferences of candidates vary by characteristics such as race, 
prior academic preparation and experience. To do so, we matched applicants from job fair sign-
in sheet data to their centrally stored CPS applications using first and last names and the last four 
digits of applicant social security numbers.  Figure 2 shows a histogram describing the fraction 
of applicants per school who we were able to match to CPS application files.   In the average 
school, we matched 80 percent of individuals who signed-in at the school during a job fair to 
their application files.  Matching rates ranged from 50 to 100 percent, and we were able to match 
over two-thirds (68%) of teachers for 90 percent of schools.  Since we are only able to conduct 
the subgroup analysis below on those applicants who matched to the central CPS application 
data, a clear concern is whether the match probability is correlated with any factors that might be 
related to the applicant preferences for school type.  Fortunately, an analysis of the predictors of 
matching (shown in the Appendix) suggests that observable school characteristics are not 
systematically associated with the match probability, providing reassurance that our estimates on 
the sample of matched applicants will provide reasonable estimates of the full population.  
Table 6 shows results from models that regress the log transformed number of applicants 
to a school on school demographics, separately by various applicant groups. We use the log 18 
 
specification here to allow easier comparison across the groups since group sizes (and thus the 
mean number of applications per group) differ substantially The subgroups of interest include 
Black, Hispanic, and White/Asian applicants, applicants with undergraduate degrees in 
mathematics or science, and applicants from the most competitive undergraduate institutions 
(about 13% of the total sample).  We show models that include all of the school-composition and 
demographic variables of interest as well as controls (similar to specification shown in Table 5, 
Column 4). Importantly, column 2 shows that results for matched applicants are virtually 
identical to results for the full sample (Column 1), indicating that the 80 percent of job fair 
applicants that we were able to match to their centrally stored application files appear to have 
similar preferences to the full applicant pool. 
Results indicate that applicant preferences for school characteristics vary substantially by 
applicant race/ethnicity. African American applicants are less likely to apply to schools with 
larger proportions of White or Asian students and more likely to apply to schools in Regions 3 
through 6 than they are to schools in CPS Region 1.  For example, the coefficient .936 on the 
Region 6 measure indicates that schools in Region 6 receive nearly twice as many (100 percent 
more) applications from African American candidates than schools in Region 1.  Schools in 
regions 4 and 5 receive 42 and 54 percent more applications than Region 1 schools.  Regions 3-6 
are located on the South side of Chicago, which has a larger percentage of African American 
residents than other areas of the city.  Yet, the region indicators are still large and significant in 
models that control for zip code racial composition.  It is possible that African-American teacher 
applicants are more likely to be living in South side neighborhoods, or have friends and family in 
these neighborhoods, which could make the areas more appealing. 19 
 
Not surprisingly, Hispanic applicants are more likely to apply to schools serving larger 
percentages of LEP students.  They are also less likely to apply to schools with larger 
proportions of White or Asian students, and less likely to apply to schools serving more free 
lunch eligible students (all else equal).   
In addition, we find that the preferences of applicants with undergraduate degrees in 
mathematics or science differ notably from those of other applicants.  As Column 6 indicates, 
these candidates were statistically significantly more likely to apply to schools with larger 
proportions of students meeting basic levels of academic proficiency.  Interestingly, controlling 
for other school demographic and composition indicators, applicants with mathematics or 
science degrees also show no geographic or regional preferences.  The pattern of results for 
applicants who attended the most selective undergraduate institutions (Column 7) is very similar 
to results for the full sample (Column 1). 
 
6. Conclusions 
The distribution of teachers across schools results from a two-sided matching process in 
which both teacher and school administrator preferences play a role.  This paper uses data on 
teacher applications to specific public schools in Chicago to disentangle supply from demand 
side factors, and credibly identify the relative importance of various school characteristics to 
teachers in the initial hiring process.   
Not surprisingly, we find that teachers are substantially less likely to apply to higher-
poverty schools.  More interestingly, we find that there is little aggregate relationship between 
the number of teacher applications and school racial composition or achievement level once one 
controls for school poverty rate.  In addition, there appears to be significant heterogeneity in 20 
 
teacher preferences in ways that one might expect.  For example, African American teachers are 
relatively more likely to apply to schools with a predominantly African-American student 
population and Latino teachers are relatively more likely to apply to schools with larger limited 
English proficient populations.  Teachers with undergraduate degrees in mathematics or science 
are more likely to apply to schools serving larger proportions of academically proficient students.   
Finally, we find that indicators for the geographic region of the city in which the district 
is located are extremely powerful predictors of teacher applications.  Schools on the city’s north 
and northwest sides, and those closer to the city center, get substantially more applications than 
those on the far south or far west sides.  This relationship remains robust and significant even 
after we control for a variety of school demographic characteristics such as student poverty, 
racial composition and achievement as well as the number and type of positions available at the 
school.  In fact, geography remains an important predictor when we control for several 
potentially important neighborhood-level characteristics such as poverty, racial composition and 
crime rates.  It is likely the geographic region indicators are proxies for a number of hard-to-
observe school and/or neighborhood characteristics, such as perceived safety, community 
attitudes toward education and school leadership.  It is also possible that the geographic region 
indicators are picking up applicant preferences in terms of proximity to their own neighborhoods, 
reduced commute time, or ease of access using public transportation.  
It is interesting to consider these findings in light of recent CPS recruitment efforts.  Over 
the last decade, the CPS office of human resources has substantially increased efforts to recruit 
more widely, soliciting applicants from out of state and holding broadly publicized large-scale 
job fairs to bring in more candidates.  While the 2006 applicant pool contained over 11 potential 
candidates for each eventual hire, our analyses indicate that the vast majority of those applicants 21 
 
– including many of the most highly qualified applicants – will not apply to the schools serving 
the most disadvantaged students.  With job fair applications ranging across schools from the 
single digits to nearly 500, it is clear that despite an abundance of applicants to the district as a 
whole, many schools – whether because they are situated in less geographically desirable 
locations, because they serve the most disadvantaged student populations, or a combination of 
these factors – are likely to experience a shortage of applicants who are qualified to fill their 
vacancies.  This suggests that targeted efforts to direct a larger number of qualified applicants to 
hard-to-staff schools could have important benefits.  22 
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Other ethnicity 0.045 0.073
Applicant address
Chicago 0.483 --
Illinois, outside Chicago 0.283 --
Out of state 0.234 --
Educational Background
Has degree information 0.666 0.788
Education major 0.611 --
Math or science major 0.054 --
Humanities or social science major 0.223 --
Other major 0.138 --
Barron’s rating of undergraduate school
Most competitive 0.034 0
Highly competitive 0.099 0.064
Very competitive 0.279 0.098
Competitive 0.380 0.274
Less competitive 0.049 0.320
Not competitive 0.158 0.245
Has a masters degree 0.391 0.214
Prior Experience
Certified 0.655 --
Has resume in applicant file 0.898 --
Years of teaching experience
No prior teaching experience 0.391 0.699
1-3 years  0.327 0.300
4-10 years  0.196 0.001
11+  years  0.087 0









the job fairs 
(n=212) Diff: (1) - (2) P-value
Schools with 
good sign in 
data (n=321)
Schools with 
sign in problems 
(n=50) Diff: (5) - (6) P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Predominately Black  0.51 0.36 0.14 0.001 0.49 0.62 0.13 0.085
Predominately Hispanic  0.11 0.19 -0.08 0.006 0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.799
Predominately minority  0.14 0.17 -0.04 0.230 0.15 0.08 -0.07 0.206
Racially mixed  0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.319 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.653
Integrated  0.16 0.16 0.00 0.966 0.17 0.10 -0.07 0.204
Student Achievement (natn'l % rank) 47.86 55.17 -7.30 0.000 48.99 40.66 -8.32 0.014
Enrollment 734 634 1.00 0.015 721 814 0.92 0.249
Percent ESL students 10.20 14.55 -4.35 0.001 10.34 9.31 -1.03 0.638
Percent low income students 85.86 84.64 1.22 0.459 85.27 89.63 4.36 0.122
Elementary school 0.80 0.85 -0.06 0.092 0.81 0.72 -0.09 0.141
Magnet school 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.916 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.663
Number of open positions May 2006 5.61 4.00 1.61 0.000 5.34 7.33 1.99 0.001
Number of vacancies in June 2006 4.10 2.46 1.64 0.000 3.86 5.61 1.75 0.001
Actual sample size varies due to missing data for individual variables.  
Table does not include charter schools, special education schools or alternative schools.  
Columns 4 and 8 are the p-values for coefficients in columns 3 and 7, respectively.  
Table 2 - Demographic characteristics of CPS schools that participated in job fairs, schools that did not, and by quality of sign in data (n=583).    
The coefficients in columns 3 and 7 are estimates from bivariate regressions predicting the variable from that row using whether schools attended at least one job 
fair (3) or whether job fair schools had problematic sign in data (7).  
All schools that participated in the job fairs26 
 
Table 3 - Summary Statistics for Chicago Public Schools Participating in the Summer 2006 Job Fairs
All Schools High Schools
School Participation in Job Fairs
Participated May job fair 0.673 0.610 0.878
Participated in June job fair 0.655 0.617 0.779
Participated in July job fair 0.540 0.504 0.656
Number of applications (per job fair)
Mean 54.505 55.518 51.237
Standard Deviation 36.921 38.609 30.752
10th percentile 18 19 15
90th percentile 102 104 93
Vacancy Information
Number of open positions as of May  5.604 4.796 8.215
Number of vacancies as of June 26th   4.277 3.335 7.322
On-Line Registration Information for Job Fairs
Number of anticipated vacancies 1.810 1.738 2.029
Number of current vacancies 2.458 1.994 3.876
Number of new hires looking to make 4.556 3.671 7.324
Missing data from on-line registration  0.160 0.166 0.139
Information on Position Needs by Subject (yes/no)
Kindergarten or Pre-K 0.131 0.131
Grades 1-3 0.383 0.383
Grades 4-8 0.346 0.346
Special education 0.507 0.475 0.610
Bilingual 0.090 0.100 0.059
Gym 0.174 0.163 0.212
Administration 0.349 0.328 0.415
Foreign language 0.271 0.271
Fine arts 0.390 0.390
Math or science 0.695 0.695
Social studies  0.203 0.203
English 0.449 0.449
Vocational class 0.534 0.534
Other subject 0.008 0.008
Predominantly African-American 0.515 0.520 0.496
Predominantly Hispanic 0.108 0.138 0.008
Predominantly African-American and Hispanic 0.139 0.116 0.213
Racially mixed 0.097 0.078 0.157
Racially integrated 0.142 0.147 0.126
Percent proficient 46.644 52.573 21.355
Percent free-lunch eligible 86.387 86.414 86.292
Percent limited English proficient 10.304 11.988 4.436
Magnet school 0.090 0.087 0.099
Enrollment (in 100s) 7.427 6.480 10.726
Elementary 
Schools
This table includes information for the 321 schools that participated in the Summer 2006 job fairs that had good 
sign-in data.  Schools with problematic sign in data are excluded.  27 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable:
School-level independent variables
Percent White, Asian, Native American 0.350*** 0.473*** 0.258** 0.350*** 0.470*** 0.198 -0.102 -0.0716
(0.111) (0.0979) (0.124) (0.107) (0.101) (0.131) (0.157) (0.160)
Percent  Hispanic 0.0827 0.0312 0.0478 -0.000907 0.0196 -0.0293 -0.0771 0.0271
(0.0559) (0.0474) (0.0502) (0.0472) (0.0876) (0.0845) (0.0822) (0.105)
Percent eligible for free-lunch -0.404*** -0.321** -0.320* -0.399** -0.352**
(0.123) (0.160) (0.172) (0.180) (0.170)
Percent proficient 0.263*** 0.221 0.0734 0.129 0.0787
(0.0916) (0.141) (0.144) (0.143) (0.148)
Percent limited English proficient 0.322** 0.0334 0.189 0.183 0.106
(0.133) (0.217) (0.218) (0.210) (0.212)
Region 2 -3.825 -3.931 -4.089
(7.619) (6.892) (9.317)
Region 3 -17.03*** -9.096 -7.707
(6.049) (6.281) (8.706)
Region 4 -16.11*** -15.16** -13.85**
(6.068) (6.227) (6.440)
Region 5 -21.55*** -17.36*** -13.53**
(6.076) (6.454) (6.869)
Region 6 -29.11*** -25.54*** -16.14**
(5.565) (6.308) (8.159)
Number of new hires 1.906***
(0.479)
Anticipated vacancy count 3.189**
(1.307)
June job fair 23.27***
(3.192)
July job fair 22.64***
(4.041)
Zipcode-level independent variables
Percent poverty -58.18 -6.340
(38.17) (33.96)
Percent Black -19.76 -0.378
(13.91) (13.42)
Percent Hispanic -33.14*** -20.41
(12.02) (13.39)
Miles to central bus. dist. regions 1-3 -1.844 -1.227
(1.563) (1.918)
Miles to central bus. dist. regions 4-6 -3.649*** -1.734
(0.907) (1.238)
Property crimes per 100,000, avg. 2003-2005 -0.147 -0.111
(0.138) (0.143)
Violent crimes per 100,000, avg. 2003-2005 0.760 0.0874
(0.858) (0.776)
XXXXXX X
Constant -2.499 26.26 -6.392 -3.075 26.07 48.14** 52.33**
(7.056) (16.09) (7.090) (6.687) (17.89) (19.74) (22.23)
Observations 554 554 554 554 554 554 554 554
R-squared 0.397 0.401 0.396 0.393 0.402 0.435 0.441
Mean number of job applicants per school per fair was 55, with a standard deviation of 37.  
Robust standard errors, clustered by school, in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
School demographic, vacancy, position, and 
job fair controls*
Number of job fair applicants
Table 4 - Relationship between school and neighborhood characteristics and number of Summer 2006 job fair applicants applying  to 
Chicago Public Schools 
Column 1 shows coefficients from regressions that estimate number of job fair applicants using either single variables or clusters of 
similar variables.  Coefficients from separate regressions are denoted by horizontal lines in these columns.  
*Controls include school enrollment,  number of anticipated vacancies, dummies for elementary school, magnet school, indicators for 
specific number of hires school was trying to make at job fairs, indicators for types of positions school had openings in, which job 
fairs school attended. 
Observations in these analyses are school by job fair, meaning that schools that attended multiple job fairs have separate 
observations for each fair they participated in.  Observations with poor sign in data (schools that had poor quality sign in data for a 
particular job fair or multiple fairs) are excluded for those months.28 
 










Percent White, Asian, Native American -0.0716 -0.252 -0.0749 -0.137 0.313*** 0.0283 0.718*** -0.140
(0.160) (0.344) (0.365) (0.288) (0.119) (0.176) (0.261) (0.518)
Percent  Hispanic 0.0271 -0.0542 -0.133 -0.0896 0.132** 0.101 -0.277*** -0.0760
(0.105) (0.248) (0.255) (0.236) (0.0614) (0.134) (0.104) (0.253)
Percent eligible for free-lunch -0.352** -0.958*** -0.765** -0.493 -0.368*** -0.343* -0.659*** 0.492
(0.170) (0.365) (0.382) (0.316) (0.138) (0.204) (0.209) (0.455)
Percent proficient 0.0787 -0.135 -0.222 0.153 0.303** 0.00471 0.544** 0.563
(0.148) (0.350) (0.355) (0.326) (0.136) (0.164) (0.210) (0.369)
Percent limited English proficient 0.106 0.209 0.627 0.317 -14.77** -0.0824 3.192 -1.138
(0.212) (0.496) (0.506) (0.449) (7.220) (0.253) (7.496) (1.248)
Region 2 -4.089 9.893 31.81** -0.0800 1.586 -0.749 -16.70 -28.91
(9.317) (15.49) (14.83) (0.153) (9.005) (10.93) (14.24) (17.91)
Region 3 -7.707 -9.356 14.35 -0.150 -15.93** -4.003 -23.16* -32.57*
(8.706) (16.15) (14.64) (0.147) (6.798) (10.16) (13.06) (18.38)
Region 4 -13.85** -8.282 4.798 -0.202* -17.30** -14.62* -13.10 -26.35
(6.440) (13.90) (13.38) (0.114) (7.286) (7.499) (11.38) (18.24)
Region 5 -13.53** -25.56* -14.32 -0.303** -20.29*** -12.72* -25.16** -20.20
(6.869) (13.93) (13.44) (0.127) (7.078) (7.383) (11.98) (22.13)
Region 6 -16.14** -23.37 -12.51 -0.369** -28.61*** -16.20* -30.47** -24.34
(8.159) (19.36) (18.59) (0.157) (6.319) (8.907) (11.84) (29.15)
Zipcode-level independent variables
Percent poverty -6.340 76.98 129.9 -0.0387 -71.54 -18.24 -15.28 46.50
(33.96) (82.45) (82.71) (0.742) (46.15) (40.34) (62.23) (59.52)
Percent Black -0.378 22.63 18.60 0.0969 -18.92 -0.699 -33.70 -36.84
(13.42) (31.84) (30.68) (0.274) (16.92) (15.53) (24.13) (34.24)
Percent Hispanic -20.41 -37.83 -61.75** -0.248 -22.62 -10.59 -73.04*** -48.69
(13.39) (30.80) (29.33) (0.244) (13.93) (14.97) (18.66) (33.28)
Miles to central bus. dist. regions 1-3 -1.227 -1.430 2.812 0.00187 -1.679 -0.0402 0.0578 -3.446
(1.918) (3.285) (3.195) (0.0324) (1.778) (2.124) (3.579) (2.880)
Miles to central bus. dist. regions 4-6 -1.734 -3.705 -2.662 -0.0358 -4.136*** -1.716 -1.986 -0.811
(1.238) (3.096) (3.170) (0.0269) (1.175) (1.350) (1.409) (4.086)
Property crimes per 100,000, avg. 2003-2005 -0.111 -0.141 -0.0853 0.00145 -0.0745 0.0308 -0.142 -0.291
(0.143) (0.275) (0.248) (0.00362) (0.187) (0.165) (0.229) (0.221)
Violent crimes per 100,000, avg. 2003-2005 0.0874 -2.005 -3.199* -0.0171 0.836 -0.0678 0.503 1.276
(0.776) (1.808) (1.759) (0.0181) (1.087) (0.892) (1.313) (1.503)
XXXX X X
Constant 52.33** 111.8** 68.16 3.424*** 44.49* -13.11
(22.23) (43.62) (45.67) (0.425) (25.26) (42.12)
Observations 554 369 359 554 423 423 131 131
R-squared 0.441 0.379 0.489 0.414 0.446 0.662
Mean 54.505 100.09 107.19 54.505
Standard Deviation 36.921 75.66 73.48 36.921
Robust standard errors, clustered by school,  in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






Table 5 - Relationship between school characteristics and number of job fair applicants applying  to Chicago Public Schools participating in the 
Summer 2006 Job Fairs, additional specifications and separately for elementary and high schools 
Observations in these analyses, unless otherwise noted, are school by job fair, meaning that schools that attended multiple job fairs have 
separate observations for each fair they participated in.  Observations with poor sign in data (schools that had poor quality sign in data for a 
particular job fair or multiple fairs are excluded for those months).
Elementary Schools High Schools
Columns  5 and 7 show coefficients from regressions that estimate number of job fair applicants using either single variables or clusters of 
similar variables.  Coefficients from separate regressions are denoted by horizontal lines in these columns.  
School demographic, vacancy, position, and 
job fair controls*
*Controls include school enrollment,  number of anticipated vacancies, dummies for elementary school, magnet school, indicators for specific 
number of hires school was trying to make at job fairs, indicators for types of positions school had openings in, which job fairs school attended. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable:
Total Matched Black Hispanic White/Asian BA Math/Sci. Top 2 Bar.
School-level independent variables
Percent White, Asian, Native American -0.137 -0.0516 -0.632* -0.934** 0.369 0.0802 -0.355
(0.288) (0.307) (0.368) (0.436) (0.376) (0.474) (0.377)
Proportion  Hispanic -0.0896 -0.0478 -0.251 -0.0898 0.00930 -0.00731 0.0450
(0.236) (0.252) (0.274) (0.344) (0.276) (0.383) (0.287)
Prop. eligible for free-lunch -0.493 -0.451 -0.118 -0.717* -0.248 0.232 -0.466
(0.316) (0.330) (0.359) (0.431) (0.390) (0.441) (0.367)
Prop. proficient 0.153 0.148 -0.147 0.154 0.214 0.813* 0.481
(0.326) (0.339) (0.380) (0.408) (0.380) (0.432) (0.399)
Prop. limited English proficient 0.317 0.115 -0.571 2.372*** -0.390 0.0786 0.0995
(0.449) (0.487) (0.493) (0.650) (0.585) (0.853) (0.579)
Region 2 -0.0800 -0.0425 0.0686 0.217 -0.0259 0.0224 -0.0793
(0.153) (0.160) (0.163) (0.182) (0.195) (0.182) (0.178)
Region 3 -0.150 -0.143 0.287* 0.201 -0.167 -0.0704 -0.185
(0.147) (0.153) (0.160) (0.188) (0.179) (0.184) (0.164)
Region 4 -0.202* -0.218* 0.427*** -0.100 -0.442*** -0.0375 -0.440***
(0.114) (0.122) (0.149) (0.173) (0.147) (0.168) (0.144)
Region 5 -0.303** -0.322** 0.542*** -0.140 -0.523*** -0.0697 -0.515***
(0.127) (0.131) (0.159) (0.184) (0.153) (0.184) (0.150)
Region 6 -0.369** -0.362** 0.936*** -0.214 -0.675*** -0.230 -0.685***
(0.157) (0.167) (0.187) (0.246) (0.189) (0.247) (0.208)
Zipcode-level independent variables
Percent poverty -0.0387 0.0447 0.722 -0.950 0.403 0.608 0.951
(0.742) (0.762) (0.883) (1.028) (0.847) (1.048) (0.910)
Percent Black 0.0969 0.106 0.202 -0.515 0.00149 0.136 -0.116
(0.274) (0.286) (0.328) (0.373) (0.330) (0.412) (0.335)
Percent Hispanic -0.248 -0.212 -0.674* -0.289 -0.133 0.0189 -0.412
(0.244) (0.256) (0.343) (0.352) (0.327) (0.394) (0.323)
Miles to central bus. dist. regions 1-3 0.00187 -5.10e-05 -0.00320 0.0318 0.00117 0.0128 0.00777
(0.0324) (0.0338) (0.0370) (0.0367) (0.0400) (0.0476) (0.0376)
Miles to central bus. dist. regions 4-6 -0.0358 -0.0373 -0.0446 -0.0634 -0.0414 -0.00697 -0.0385
(0.0269) (0.0281) (0.0330) (0.0426) (0.0322) (0.0425) (0.0358)
Property crimes per 100,000, avg. 2003-2005 0.00145 0.00109 0.00150 -0.00256 -0.000280 -0.000617 0.00190
(0.00362) (0.00336) (0.00434) (0.00289) (0.00358) (0.00636) (0.00339)
Violent crimes per 100,000, avg. 2003-2005 -0.0171 -0.0166 -0.0290 0.0160 -0.0102 4.62e-05 -0.0220
(0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0215) (0.0225) (0.0197) (0.0307) (0.0206)
XXXX X X X
Constant 3.424*** 3.151*** 0.254 1.467*** 2.636*** 0.170 1.784***
(0.425) (0.433) (0.519) (0.507) (0.537) (0.659) (0.488)
Observations 554 554 515 426 553 382 516
R-squared 0.414 0.400 0.459 0.512 0.428 0.412 0.385
Mean 54.51 44.68 6.57 4.08 27.29 2.40 6.10
Standard Deviation 36.92 31.09 6.16 5.48 22.20 3.55 5.18
Robust standard errors, clustered by school,  in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6 - Relationship between school and neighborhod characteristics and log number of job fair applicants applying to Chicago Public 
Schools participating in the Summer 2006 Job Fairs for various applicant subgroups
Log Number of job fair applicants
Observations in these analyses are school by job fair, meaning that schools that attended multiple job fairs have separate observations 
for each fair they participated in.  Observations with poor sign in data (schools that had poor quality sign in data for a particular job fair or 
multiple fairs) are excluded for those months.
*Controls include school enrollment,  number of anticipated vacancies, dummies for elementary school, magnet school, indicators for 
specific number of hires school was trying to make at job fairs, indicators for types of positions school had openings in, which job fairs 
school attended. 
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Appendix 
In order to test for possible selective non-matching, the appendix table shows results from 
regressions predicting the fraction of applicants whose sign in data was successfully matched to 
CPS application files by school by job fair.  The dependent variable in the first two columns is 
fraction matching, and in the second two is the log transformation of fraction matching.  
Columns 1 and 3 show bivariate regressions or regressions for clusters of variables, while 
columns 2 and 4 show fully specified models.  Overall, relatively few variables of interest are 
predictive of fraction matching.  For example, fraction matching did not vary significantly by 
region.  Percent of students identified as LEP is the only statistically significant predictor of 
fraction matching in the fully specified models.  Descriptive results on fraction matching suggest 
that match rates were quite good, and that they did not vary significantly by key variables of 
interest.   33 
 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Predominately Hispanic -0.0209* 0.0151 -0.141** 0.0564
(0.0110) (0.0239) (0.0674) (0.145)
Predominately Minority -0.0112 0.0171 -0.0650 0.120
(0.0123) (0.0141) (0.0795) (0.0914)
Racially mixed -0.0241* 0.0230 -0.199** 0.110
(0.0142) (0.0179) (0.0838) (0.101)
Racially integrated -0.00863 0.0151 -0.0459 0.143
(0.0104) (0.0179) (0.0712) (0.111)
% Eligible for free-lunch 0.000153 0.000187 0.000678 0.00171
(0.000177) (0.000338) (0.00121) (0.00214)
% Proficient 0.000246 -0.000104 0.00207* -0.000116
(0.000197) (0.000395) (0.00122) (0.00257)
% Limited English Proficient -0.000507** -0.00128** -0.00326** -0.00744**
(0.000250) (0.000559) (0.00153) (0.00331)
Region 2 -0.00425 0.0108 -0.0289 0.0774
(0.0155) (0.0135) (0.0905) (0.0814)
Region 3 0.0176 0.0142 0.128 0.109
(0.0133) (0.0137) (0.0811) (0.0817)
Region 4 -0.00749 0.00122 -0.00537 0.0612
(0.0118) (0.0129) (0.0800) (0.0839)
Region 5 -0.0140 -0.0210 -0.0941 -0.128
(0.0126) (0.0134) (0.0772) (0.0785)
Region 6 0.00675 -0.00198 0.0906 0.0617
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0844) (0.0789)
Number of new hires -0.00166* -0.00952
(0.000961) (0.00611)
Anticipated vacancy count -0.000342 0.000141
(0.00222) (0.0143)
June job fair -0.0627*** -0.382***
(0.00743) (0.0478)





Observations 554 554 542 542
R-squared 0.319 0.324
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix Table - Regressions predicting percent of applicants whose sign in data matched to CPS application files by 
school
Observations in these analyses are school by job fair, meaning that schools that attended multiple job fairs have 
separate observations for each fair they participated in.  Observations with poor sign in data (schools that had poor 
quality sign in data for a particular job fair or multiple fairs are excluded for those months).
School demographic, vacancy, position, 
and job fair controls*
Fraction Matching Log Fraction Matching
*Controls include dummies for elementary school, magnet school, school enrollment, number of anticipated vacancies, 
indicators for specific number of hires school was trying to make at job fairs, indicators for types of positions school had 
openings in, which job fairs school attended. 
Columns 1 and 3 show coefficients from regressions that estimate fraction of job fair applicants matching per school 
using either single variables or clusters of similar variables.  Coefficients from separate regressions are denoted by 
horizontal lines in these columns.  
Fraction of applicants whose sign in data matched to applicatn files ranged across schools from .5 to 1, with an average 
fraction matching of .803 (median .813) across the 369 schools in the sample.
 